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A little more than one year ago, we published Critical Race
Theory: An Annotated Bibliography.' In it, we (1) traced the
history and development of the Critical Race Theory (CRT)
movement;2 (2) identified ten themes within that movement's
corpus that seemed to us central and characteristic;3 and (3)
annotated over 200 of the most important Critical Race works,
employing a numbering system corresponding to the main
themes.4
As we were working on the original bibliography, we
speculated about a number of matters that we were not able to
address in the original article: Would the prodigious output of
the Critical Race scholars that we were struggling to describe
continue unabated? Would new voices enter the arena? Would
the movement change direction, or begin to include new themes
other than the ones we found in the original 217 works? Would
it attract new criticism, the bibliography perhaps serving as a
lightning rod for less-than-friendly commentary? Would the
movement stall, having reached its apogee? One of us had
written about a similar phenomenon in legal scholarship-the
symposium movement'-and so we wondered whether a one-
year retrospective might begin to supply answers to questions
such as these. In particular, we wondered if there would be
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado School
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1. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
2. Id. at 461.
3. Id. at 462-63.
4. Id. at 464-516.
5. Jean Stefancic, The Law Review Symposium Issue: Community of
Meaning or Re-Inscription of Hierarchy?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 651 (1992).
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anything like an "observer" effect, in which the attention drawn
by the annotation or symposium changes the phenomenon
described.6
This update provides (a) annotations of the principal works
of Critical Race scholarship that appeared during a period of
approximately one year7 following the cut-off for the original
bibliography, and (b) commentary and analysis aimed at
shedding light on the above questions. Our methodology for
choosing, annotating, and headnoting items was similar to that
employed in the original bibliography,' with a single exception.
Responding to a substantial increase in writing by and about
women of color, we added Theme number 11, Critical Race
Feminism, to our list.9
To be included, a work needed to address one or more
themes we considered to fall within Critical Race thought. The
eleven themes, together with the numbering system we employ,
follow:
1. Critique of liberalism. Most, if not all, CRT writers are
discontent with liberalism as a means of addressing the
American race problem. Sometimes this discontent is only
implicit in an article's structure or focus. At other times, the
author takes as his or her target a mainstay of liberal jurispru-
6. See infra text accompanying note 40 (addressing this and related
questions).
7. This bibliography covers works which came out after the publication
deadline for the original bibliography (late 1992) and before January 1, 1994.
8. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 1, at 461-62, 463-64. We entered into a
master database every work published by a recognized Critical Race scholar
during the period in question. We then read each item to make sure that it did
indeed incorporate one or more clearly recognizable Critical themes or ideas. We
noted additional works cited or discussed by these authors for possible inclusion.
Then we sent a preliminary draft of this update to each author requesting
comments and corrections. We also invited suggestions for additional authors and
works we might have overlooked.
In addition to our methodology, the numbering scheme for classifying the
books and articles is identical to that used in the original bibliography, id. at 462-
63, with the exception of Theme number 11, which is new to this bibliography.
The theme descriptions, which are identical to those used in the original
bibliography, have been reprinted with the permission of the authors and the
Virginia Law Review.
9. Will there one day be a headnote: Critical Race Masculinism (Theme 12)?
We have chosen not to create one at this time, although there is a discernible body
of emerging writing on this subject. E.g., Brown, The Social Construction of a
Rape Victim: Stories of African-American Males About the Rape of Desiree
Washington, infra pp. 165-66; Culp, Notes From California: Rodney King and the
Race Question, infra p. 169.
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dence such as affirmative action, neutrality, color blindness,
role modeling, or the merit principle. (Theme number 1).
2. Storytelling I counterstorytelling and "naming one's own
reality." Many Critical Race theorists consider the majoritarian
mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdom, and
shared cultural understandings of persons in the dominant
group-to be a principal obstacle to racial reform. To analyze
and challenge these power-laden beliefs, some writers employ
counterstories, parables, chronicles, and anecdotes aimed at
revealing their contingency, cruelty, and self-serving nature.
(Theme number 2).
3. Revisionist interpretations of American civil rights law
and progress. One recurring question for Critical scholars is
why American antidiscrimination law has proven so ineffective
in redressing racial inequality-or why progress has been
cyclical, consisting of alternating periods of advance followed by
ones of retrenchment. Some Critical scholars address this
question by seeking answers in the psychology of race, white
self-interest, the politics of colonialism and anticolonialism, or
other sources. (Theme number 3).
4. A greater understanding of the underpinnings of race
and racism. A number of Critical writers seek to apply insights
from social science writing on race and racism to legal prob-
lems. For example, understanding how majoritarian society
sees black sexuality helps explain the law's treatment of
interracial sex, marriage, and adoption; knowing how different
settings encourage or discourage discrimination helps in
deciding whether the movement toward Alternative Dispute
Resolution is likely to help or hurt disempowered disputants.
(Theme number 4).
5. Structural determinism. A number of CRT writers focus
on ways in which the structure of legal thought or culture
influences its content, frequently in a status quo-maintaining
direction. Understanding these constraints results in working
more effectively towards racial and other types of reform.
(Theme number 5).
6. Race, sex, class, and their intersections. Other scholars
explore the intersections of race, sex, and class, pursuing such
questions as whether race and class are separate disadvantag-
ing factors, or the extent to which black women's interests are
or are not adequately represented in the contemporary women's
movement. (Theme number 6).
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7. Essentialism and anti-essentialism. Scholars who write
about these issues are concerned with the appropriate unit for
analysis: Is the black community one, or many, communities?
Do middle- and working-class African-Americans have different
interests and needs? Do all oppressed peoples have something
in common? (Theme number 7).
8. Cultural nationalism Iseparatism. An emerging strain
within CRT holds that people of color can best promote their
interests through separation from the American mainstream.
Some believe that preserving diversity and separateness will
benefit all, not just groups of color. We include here, as well,
articles encouraging black nationalism, power, or insurrection.
(Theme number 8).
9. Legal institutions, Critical pedagogy, and minorities in
the bar. Women and scholars of color have long been concerned
about representation in law school and the bar. Recently, a
number of authors have begun to search for new approaches to
these questions and to develop an alternative, Critical pedago-
gy. (Theme number 9).
10. Criticism and self-criticism; responses. Under this
heading we include works of significant criticism addressed at
CRT, either by outsiders or persons within the movement,
together with responses to such criticism. (Theme number 10).
11. Critical Race feminism. Here we include works
addressing the unique situation of women of color (other than
intersectionality (Theme number 6) and essentialism (Theme
number 7)), such as reproductive freedom and the social
construction of women of color. (Theme number 11).
A final note about our methodology: What follows is a list
of articles and books-not of persons, much less members of a
school. CRT lacks a formal organizational structure; there are
no members as such. Many of the authors whose works we
include devote only a portion of their output to Critical jurispru-
dence. Others are flatly critical of CRT (see Theme number 10)
or discuss its place within legal thought in general. Our
annotations cannot begin to do justice to the rich body of
Critical thought they summarize. We warrant only that the
works that follow can shed light on one or more aspects of
Critical Race Theory, and we invite readers to study the
complete works for themselves.
CRITICAL RACE THEORY
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aleinikoff, T. Alexander, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship,
1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 961. (Themes 3, 5).
Re-examines Justice Harlan's "our Constitution is color-
blind" dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.10 Responds to
conservatives' misappropriation of the phrase, showing
that it was not intended as an enshrinement of color-
blindness, but as a prohibition against a caste system
characterized by white supremacy. Suggests new
attention to the concept of "liberty," which has deep
roots in the civil rights movement, and may be under-
stood to encompass positive rights as well as anti-caste
protection.
Barnes, Robin D., Standing Guard for the P.C. Militia, or,
Fighting Hatred and Indifference: Some Thoughts on Expres-
sive Hate-Conduct and Political Correctness, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev.
979. (Themes 1, 4).
Urges more stringent penalties for perpetrators of race
crimes and hate speech. Rejects the view that those who
call for such a response are engaging in censorship, since
persons who utter targeted racial vilification are not
inviting their victims to engage in a dialogue, but are
hoping to silence and harass them. Asserts that campus
hate speech impairs the university's ability to serve its
broad social functions and, ultimately, threatens nation-
al productivity if promising students of color leave or
become demoralized. Rejects the view that the debate is
only about feelings or about merely symbolic concessions
to campus activists.
Bell, Derrick, Political Reality Testing: 1993, 61 Fordham L.
Rev. 1033 (1993). (Themes 1, 2, 3, 4, 8).
Applies themes from his recent book, Faces at the
Bottom of the Well," to the current political scene.
While applauding President Clinton's intention, declared
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM (1992).
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in the 1993 State of the Union address, to bring about
social reforms, points out and discusses two matters
Clinton neglected: (1) the status of black Americans is
far worse than that of whites, and (2) white racism
blocks reforms that would benefit whites as well as
blacks. Discusses scapegoating, tokenism, code words,
and the rallying of antiblack sentiment among low-
income whites. Illustrates the ineffectiveness of antidis-
crimination laws and policies by means of a hypothetical
Racial Preference Licensing Act, and shows the fragility
of black rights with a hypothetical "Chronicle of the
Space Traders."
Bell, Derrick & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers
as Learners, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2025 (1993). (Themes 2, 9, 10).
Critiques Judge Harry Edwards' recent article 12 which
charges that law schools have abandoned their mission
of teaching practical scholarship. Contends that Ed-
wards fails to acknowledge the contributions of new
approaches such as feminism and Critical Race Theory
because they depart from traditional legal pedagogy.
Proposes that interdisciplinary and critical scholarship
offer alternative approaches that address the crisis of
ethics in the practice of law, a situation that Judge
Edwards finds so disturbing. (Foreword by Derrick Bell,
article by Bell and Erin Edmonds).
Brooks, Roy L., A Critical Race Theory Critique of the Right to
a Jury Trial Under Title VII, 5 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 159
(1993). (Themes 1, 4).
Analyzes a recent amendment to Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act affording a jury trial in cases that
include a demand for compensatory or punitive damages.
Warns that the jury-trial provision may not be a positive
development because racism is an ingrained, ordinary
and normal feature of American life and experience. As
a result, jurors are apt to be no fairer than judges in
setting damages, and likely worse. Asserts that proce-
dural devices, such as voir dire and post-trial motions,
are unlikely to be able to control prejudice on the part of
12. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
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jurors because of the cost of employing them and the
difficulty of making racism manifest. Consequently,
minority plaintiffs now have an even greater chance of
losing Title VII lawsuits.
Brown, Kevin, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?:
The Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and
Public Education, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 813 (1993). (Themes 1, 5, 8).
Argues that the current debate over African-American
immersion schools (schools that emphasize Black pride
and an Afrocentric perspective) does not take account of
the real justification for those schools, namely equipping
black students to overcome racial obstacles contributing
to their own repression at the hands of the dominant
culture. Once we lose sight of this justification, there is
no good way for the law to resolve the constitutionality
of these schools-any solution will lead to a paradox.
Brown, Kevin, The Legal Rhetorical Structure for the Conver-
sion of Desegregation Lawsuits to Quality Education Lawsuits,
42 Emory L.J. 791 (1993). (Themes 1, 3, 5, 8).
Shows how the Supreme Court in Freeman v. Pitts
13
gives federal courts discretion to relinquish supervision
over student assignments yet insist that predominantly
black and predominantly white schools are given roughly
equal funding. Discusses the historical debate among
African-Americans over integrated versus separate
education. Highlights the paradoxical nature of the
Supreme Court's framework for resolving de jure
segregation, namely, that the needs for segregation in
the past and desegregation now are both premised on
African-American inferiority. Points out that advocates
of racial separation today are able to urge that mutual
respect and African-American equality support their
position.
Brown, Kevin, The Social Construction of a Rape Victim:
Stories of African-American Males About the Rape of Desiree
Washington, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 997. (Themes 2, 4, 6, 7).
Uses conversations with African-American males in
Indianapolis to show how belief systems operating in the
13. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
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black community helped construct Mike Tyson as a
victim, even though he was accused and convicted of
raping Desiree Washington. Points out that loyalty to
the black community demands that racism trump sexism
as the first fight to be won, due to the fundamental
belief that justice is white. Argues that this view
victimizes African-American women indefinitely, because
the racial problem will never be solved. Further argues
that African-American men are victimized by the
reinforced stereotypes of them as violent and oversexed.
Calmore, John 0., Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission
Report: A Back-to-the-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1487
(1993). (Themes 1, 3, 8).
Re-examines the 1968 Kerner Commission's conclusion
that the "urban crisis" needed two kinds of solutions: (1)
programs to encourage the integration of blacks into
white neighborhoods, and (2) programs to improve the
quality of life in existing black communities. Urges
attention to a "spatial equality" approach, namely
redirecting resources to improve housing and enrich life
in black communities. Critiques the traditional civil
rights focus on integrated housing, showing that Whites
resist it strongly beyond a certain point, and that the
token blacks who are accepted suffer constant stress as
well as a loss of community connection. Shows how
federal policies, especially after World War II, such as
FHA and VA mortgage qualifications, together with
other practices such as redlining and neighborhood
covenants, made it difficult or impossible for blacks to
buy adequate housing. Suggests strategies to assure
affordable housing in communities of color as well as
integrated housing opportunities.
Chang, Robert S., Toward an Asian American Legal Scholar-
ship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative
Space, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1241 (1993). (Themes 2, 3, 5, 7, 10).
Examines historical and present nativist violence and
discrimination along with the Model Minority Myth
(which holds that Asian Americans-the Model Minori-
ty-adapt to the dominant social groups and achieve
success quickly and easily) as mechanisms of oppression
targeted specifically against Asian Americans. Demon-
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strates how acts of violence are dismissed as isolated
incidents, while the Model Minority Myth's denial of
such discrimination serves to perpetuate its existence.
Argues that the latter device not only disadvantages
Asian Americans, but harms other minority groups as
well, when their valid claims of racial bias are discount-
ed as failure to strive. Discusses the use and justifica-
tion of narrative in Asian American outsider scholarship
generally. Argues that Critical scholarship must expand
to include Asians' narratives and experiences, and that
without these, CRT cannot give an adequate account of
the experience of any group of color. Concludes by
proposing a post-structuralist critique as the most
effective locus for the emerging and much-needed Asian
American legal scholarship.
Cook, Anthony, Cultural Racism and the Limits of Rationality
in the Saga of Rodney King, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 297 (1993).
(Themes 1, 3, 5).
Discusses three levels of conscious and unconscious rac-
ism-individual, institutional, and cultural-that Cook
believes were present in the minds of jurors who acquit-
ted the police officers who beat Rodney King. Shows
that intentional individual racism embraces and stems
from a rationalist model. Examines the way institu-
tions, through bureaucratic group-think, develop facially
neutral norms which can result in racist actions and
decisions. Describes how cultural racism is rooted in
assumptions of white racial superiority found in Judeo-
Christian beliefs, Newtonian science, and the Enlight-
enment. Argues that the jurors, despite indisputable
videotape evidence, could not escape these forces and so
voted for acquittal.
Cook, Anthony E., The Spiritual Movement Towards Justice,
1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1007. (Themes 1, 2, 6, 7, 8).
Shows how black strategies for fighting racial oppression
shift from accentuating sameness (during Abolition and
the Civil Rights Movement) when whites emphasized
race-conscious particularism, to praising difference
(during the Black Power struggle) when whites insisted
on colorblind universalism. Calls for a spiritual move-
ment that will balance the tension between unifying
19941
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universalism and a parochial particularism. Hopes that
Critical Race Theory will be able to develop such a
synthesis.
Crenshaw, Kimberl W. & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice,
70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 283 (1993). (Themes 1, 3, 4, 5)
Describes how defense counsel broke down the videotape
of Rodney King's beating into individual still pictures,
none of which conclusively showed "excessive force,"
thereby presenting Rodney King as a threat to police
rather than a victim of their brutality. Shows that this
process (of divorcing meaning from context) is similar to
that which the Supreme Court used in disaggregating
the evidence presented by the City of Richmond in City
of Richmond v. Croson,14 thereby converting a race-
conscious affirmative action case into one of colorblind-
ness and formal legal equality. Declares that in each
arena a struggle ensued over which narrative would
prevail in interpreting events, exposing the inadequacy
of a simplistic "rule of law" to mediate these conflicts.
Crenshaw, Kimberlb W., Words That Wound: Critical Race
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993).
See Matsuda, Mari J., et al., Words that Wound:
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech and the First
Amendment (1993). 15
Culp, Jerome M., Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the
1991 Civil Rights Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent
Reform, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 965 (1993). (Themes 1, 3).
Reviews assumptions in the debate surrounding the
passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, identifying three
fundamental errors: (1) the fixity assumption (belief in
a permanent and fixed legal standard), (2) the neutrality
assumption (belief that it is possible to develop neutral
standards), and (3) the failure to ask "the race ques-
tion'"-viz., take seriously the reality of racism in
America. Examines how the Supreme Court deemed
race an irrelevant issue in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
14. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
15. See infra p. 182.
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Education" and other employment discrimination
cases, thus enshrining an official view that is blind to
the history of past wrongs against blacks and vigilant
against special benefits toward them. Shows how a law
and economics approach to Title VII incorporates many
of the errors mentioned above, and demonstrates how
recent Supreme Court decisions frustrate Title VII's
intention to increase the number of black employees.
Discusses how the 1991 Civil Rights Act leaves unre-
solved two critical issues: coverage of small employers
and temporary workers, and hiring minorities in profes-
sional settings such as the academic marketplace. The
combination of a sluggish Congress and a refractory
Court implies that blacks' disadvantage in the workplace
may well be permanent.
Culp, Jerome M., Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and
the Race Question, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 199 (1993). (Themes 1,
3, 4).
Points out that California, the most multiracial state,
has failed to fulfill its promise of racial justice in the
wake of the Rodney King case and the Los Angeles
insurrection. Explains the "rules of engagement" by
which African-American males are taught to survive in
the face of a hostile criminal justice system. Argues that
failing to acknowledge race in matters of criminal justice
increases racial subordination. Examines the case of a
sixty-five-year-old white woman receiving worker's
compensation due to her aversion toward black men
after she was attacked by an unidentified male she
insisted was black. Urges that law and legal remedies
should not be racially blind or silent and that "the race
question" should be constantly and insistently asked.
Culp, Jerome M., Jr., You Can Take Them to Water but You
Can't Make Them Drink: Black Legal Scholarship and White
Legal Scholars, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1021. (Themes 2, 4, 6, 9).
Analyzes and compares stories by scholars of color that
white legal scholars find comprehensible with those they
generally do not. Notes the wide public acceptance of
16. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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Stephen Carter's Reflections of an Affirmative Action
Baby 7 and shows that Patricia Williams' The Alchemy
of Race and Rights18 is less understood and accepted by
whites because it is unconventional, oppositional, and
tells stories whites do not like to hear. Concludes that
Williams' approach, if heeded by majority race legal
scholars, can transform the legal system into one that
will take seriously the lives and experiences of black
people.
Davis, Peggy C., Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe
v. Wade, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 299 (1993). (Themes 3, 6).
Traces the impact of slavery and abolition on the
development of family law. Shows that attention to
these neglected stories can illuminate recent legal
struggles over such issues as parental rights, abortion,
contraception, sterilization, and the status of children.
Demonstrates that the ideal of family liberty was refined
and strengthened through the struggle against slavery
and caste oppression. Concludes that the same princi-
ples of respect for individuals and the inviolability of life
that animated emancipation and Reconstruction can and
should shape the developing law of intimate communi-
ties.
Delgado, Richard, Five Months Later (The Trial Court Opinion),
71 Tex. L. Rev. 1011 (1993). (Themes 1, 2).
Presents a fictional trial court opinion written by a
federal judge upholding the minority hiring programs of
several law schools and the American Association of Law
Schools. Follows an earlier article by Michael Paul-
sen 9 in which the same judge overruled a motion for
summary judgment brought by the schools when sued by
a disappointed white applicant for a law teaching
position. Shows how case law and social policies can
easily be marshalled to support race-conscious hiring,
indeed, that the law schools' "two-pile" procedure might
17. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
(1991).
18. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
19. Michael S. Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty
Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 993 (1993).
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well have been instituted to protect applicants such as
the disappointed white.
Delgado, Richard, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence,
34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 741 (1993). (Themes 7, 10).
Discusses two movements respecting outsider jurispru-
dence-the call for standards by which radical feminist
or Critical Race scholarship can be judged, and anties-
sentialism, the tendency of these groups successively to
identify smaller subgroups within themselves. Argues
that the first movement is premature and potentially
harmful, while the second (antiessentialism) is normal
and not to be deplored. Argues that both developments
are responses to power shifts and concern over paradigm
change.
Delgado, Richard, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to
Farber and Sherry, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 665 (1993). (Theme 10).
Replies to Farber and Sherry's critique of narrative
jurisprudence. ° Points out that critics overlook that
majoritarians tell stories too (although these seem not at
all like stories, but the truth). Points out a number of
errors and misstatements in Farber and Sherry's
critique, including their mistaken belief that the validity
of CRT storytelling rests on the claim of a distinct
minority "voice" and that narrative writing poses greater
than usual risks of lack of authenticity, typicality, truth,
and reasoned analysis.
Delgado, Richard, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics
and Politics of Race, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1183 (1993). (Themes 1,
2, 4).
Rodrigo Crenshaw (the author's fictional alter ego)
returns from exile and engages in a dialogue with his
mentor about issues of race, in particular the question
of whether the economic marketplace is likely over time
to eliminate racism because nonracist businesses will
drive out ones that discriminate. Rodrigo argues that
racism will tend to increase, not decrease, in a capitalist
system because of the operation of a widely shared
construction or stereotype and because of Western myths
20. See infra p. 175.
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about salvation and superiority, all operating together in
a "neo-crypto theologico double feedback loop" to keep
African-Americans and others in a subordinate position.
Delgado, Richard, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle: Care, Competi-
tion, and the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 387
(1993). (Themes 2, 3, 5).
Rodrigo outlines a new civil rights strategy based on
love. In his ideal society, caregiving would be socialized,
while the productive sector would be relegated to
competition and the free market economy. Concentrated
caregiving would redeem many whom our society
currently ignores. Crossovers from the two sectors
would assure a vibrant, productive, and well-equipped
caregiving sector, effectively providing for those who now
exist "beyond love." Suggests a new mythic framework
and a new form of coercion in order to begin moving
toward such a society.
Delgado, Richard, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and
Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1133 (1993).
(Themes 2, 3, 5).
Rodrigo and the professor use an incident at Rodrigo's
law school as a springboard for discussing the difficulty
of redressing social harms through neutral legal and
social rules. Rodrigo argues that in a society such as
ours, even a decision maker with the most pristine social
conscience and no traces of overt racism will still end up
making decisions adverse to minorities of color. Analyz-
es the cultural background against which our society
and legal system render decisions, concluding that it has
much more efficacy than law on the books. Notes that
even race-conscious rules intended to protect and benefit
minorities generally end up making matters worse.
Gives a number of cultural and structural reasons for
the persistence of racism even in a society whose formal
rules condemn it.
Delgado, Richard, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil
Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1581
(1993). (Themes 1, 2, 9).
Rodrigo and the professor discuss the highly normative
turn legal education has taken. They decide that the
CRITICAL RACE THEORY
intense preoccupation with professional responsibility
and vague, aspirational catch phrases like "the role of
the good lawyer" are aspects of the "Owl of Minerva"
phenomenon and by-products of a profession and a
culture in decline. Instead of engaging in denial and
normative discussion, they conclude, we would do better
to confront our racial and economic problems directly.
In this fashion, outsider discourse and insights can
break the circle of nonproductive, predictable, normative
dialogue that rarely goes anywhere.
Delgado, Richard, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Expression
and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 737 (1993).
See Stefancic, Jean & Richard Delgado, A Shifting
Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech
Restriction, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 737 (1993).21
Delgado, Richard, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory,
Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993).
See Matsuda, Marl et al., Words That Wound: Critical
Race Theory, Assaultive Speech and the First Amend-
ment (1993).22
Edmonds, Erin, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 2025 (1993).
See Bell, Derrick & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teach-
ers, Teachers as Learners, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2025
(1993).23
Espinoza, Leslie G., The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 Am. U.
J. Gender & L. 121 (1993). (Themes 4, 9).
Examines actual LSAT questions for test bias, finding
that many incorporate stories that are offensive-that
degrade women, reinforce stereotypes, or remind outsid-
ers that they are outsiders. Such items bring out
socialized self-doubt and hinder performance. Other
items encode cultural views, presuppositions, informa-
tion, or preferences that test-takers of color or from
disadvantaged backgrounds may not share. Describes
test agencies' resistance to mandated disclosure of tests
21. See infra p. 187.
22. See infra p. 182.
23. See supra p. 164.
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and test items, and argues for continuing narrative
analysis of test items through public exposure.
Evans, Monica J., Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw
Culture and the Rhetoric of Rights, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
263 (1993). (Themes 1, 2, 8, 11).
Compares the predicament of black women to that de-
scribed in early African-American escape songs and
spirituals. Urges that the messages of those songs,
which included resistance and subversion (themes heard
only by the slaves) have special force today, when many
communities of color live a constructed identity as
outlaws. Examines the role of black women as shapers
of a positive, outlaw culture-which included theft,
passive resistance, noncooperation with the draft, and
cheating-as an alternative to their continued subjuga-
tion. Uses example of nineteenth century black women's
clubs to illustrate how assertion and resistance can
subvert the dominant definition of woman and shows
how rights discourse is fully consistent with a communi-
ty-based model of reconstructive theory and practice.
Fair, Bryan K., Foreword: Rethinking the Colorblindness
Model, 13 Nat'l Black L.J. 1 (1993). (Themes 1, 2, 3, 5).
Shows that racial inequality and color awareness,
including government-sponsored or -sanctioned discrimi-
nation against blacks and others, are dominant themes
in U.S. racial history. Examines the evolution of the
antidiscrimination principle and the competing visions
of the colorblindness model to reveal the means by
which colorblindness today permits the same racial
subordination allowed by the separate-but-equal doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson.24  Demonstrates that the Su-
preme Court analyzes race and gender classifications
differently, and suggests that the Court's different
treatment of these discrimination cases is unwarranted.
Advocates applying the gender classification standard to
racial cases for a fairer and more consistent result.
Supports his argument by applying to the facts of City
of Richmond v. Croson2 1 the Court's ground of differ-
24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
25. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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ence rationale usually applied in sex discrimination
cases.
Farber, Daniel A. & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stores Out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807
(1993). (Themes 2, 10).
Evaluates the legal storytelling movement and its
claims. Asserts that women and people of color do not
write or speak in a special or different voice inaccessible
to others. Holds that legal storytelling may be a useful
and valid form of scholarship, but that it also has
dangers. Stories may be inauthentic, atypical, or
untrue. Moreover, they may be used to support a
particular interpretation of an event (for example,
discrimination in a department store) when other
interpretations are equally plausible. Moreover, stories
must be adequately tied to legal doctrine and analysis to
be useful to lawyers; many that have been offered so far
are not. Concludes with a call for a standard for
evaluating the new narrative scholarship so that the
legal academy will be able to recognize high quality
narratives and condemn those that fail to meet the
standard.
Flagg, Barbara J., Was Blind But Now I See: White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent,
91 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1993). (Themes 1, 4, 5).
Argues for greater Critical focus on whiteness, and in
particular the way in which ostensibly race-neutral legal
rules end up favoring whites and disadvantaging blacks.
Urges that "transparency" be recognized as a defining
characteristic of whiteness and that skepticism toward
whiteness is overdue. This new skeptical stance toward
whiteness can ultimately lead to development of a
positive white racial identity, one that sees whiteness
not as a racial norm but as merely one racial identity
among many. Government decisionmakers (including
courts) should adopt the same skepticism, taking
responsibility for eradicating the racism that arises from
unquestioned application of neutral rules and norms
that perpetuate white advantage.
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Gordon, James W., Did the First Justice Harlan Have a Black
Brother? 15 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 159 (1993). (Theme 3).
In 1848, James Harlan, the father of future Supreme
Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, appeared in a
Kentucky courtroom for the purpose of freeing his thirty-
two-year-old slave, Robert Harlan. Robert, a light-
skinned, blue-eyed man, had been raised in the house-
hold of the Harlan family, given an informal education,
and afforded opportunities to travel and make money.
Argues that the special treatment accorded Robert by
his influential master-family has a simple explanation:
Robert Harlan was James Harlan's son, and the first
Justice Harlan (the author of the famous dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson26 ) had a black half-brother. Traces
the lives of Robert and the other Harlans; reviews the
history of miscegenation in the antebellum South; and
concludes that the special relation of Robert and the
young Justice-to-be may have shaped his dream of a
color-blind future-"and by writing about it [he] ...
began the process of creating it."
Greene, Dwight L., Justice Scalia and Tonto: Judicial Plural-
istic Ignorance and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in
Bostick v. Florida, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1979 (1993). (Themes 1, 8).
Challenges Justice Antonin Scalia's view that ethnic
whites are not privileged and cannot be held responsible
for the legacy of discrimination against blacks. Uses
stories to illustrate ways class and color privilege whites
and burden people of color. Shows how twenty years of
Republican judicial appointments produced demographi-
cally distorted courts. Demonstrates how judges, by
virtue of their similar class, ideology, and race, form a
cognitive reference group sharing erroneous beliefs about
individuals not like them ("pluralistic ignorance").
Shows how judges draw and build on shared myths (e.g.,
the Lone Ranger and Tonto) to reconcile disparities
between the treatment of blacks and whites, particularly
in police encounters. Suggests alternatives to "colorless
individualism," including developing a more diverse
judiciary and using a broader reasonable person stan-
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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dard. Advocates rights training in communities of color
so that people can learn how to exercise their rights in
encounters with police and "just say no."
Guinier, Lani, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 Tex. L. Rev.
1589 (1993). (Themes 1, 5).
Counters arguments by critics of the Voting Rights Act
that race-conscious districting and group representation
diminish democracy, cause fixation on racial identity,
and unfairly dilute the white vote. Defends group
representation while questioning whether race-conscious
or territorial districting is the most effective way of
assuring that all have a voice. Suggests "one-vote-one-
value" as an alternative to gerrymandering and winner-
take-all elections. Illustrates all these points by means
of an analysis of a recent election in a Brooklyn/Queens
district.
Guinier, Lani, The Representation of Minority Interests: The
Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1135
(1993). (Themes 1, 5).
Focuses on the limits of districting as a method for
representing minority interests. Develops two critical
assumptions that should underlie a political fairness
standard: representing interest constituencies and
insuring these constituencies' proportional influence.
Discusses three generations of voting rights issues: (1)
gaining direct access to the ballot, (2) increasing the
number of minorities in elected office, and (3) analyzing
how minority group interests are marginalized and
diluted even when minorities are elected. Argues that
winner-take-all single-member districting has failed to
mobilize sustained voter participation, foster useful
debate about issues, or go beyond tokenism in promoting
opportunities for minorities. Discusses alternative
election systems to single-member majority black
districts, such as minority influence districts or cumula-
tive voting (which abandons districting altogether).
Declares that proportionate interest representation can
reduce the legislative power of a prejudiced majority and
assure that minority votes are not diluted.
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Harris, Cheryl I., Law Professors of Color and the Academy: Of
Poets and Kings, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 331 (1992). (Themes 2,
9, 11).
Incorporates Chinua Achebe's stories of African kings
regarding power and its associated risks. Illustrates
similarities between the tribulations Achebe recounts
and those of scholars of color today. Argues that it is the
duty of scholars of color to expose law's hypocrisy and
oppression, despite the risk that doing so may make "the
king" angry. Recalls her own ambivalence and double-
consciousness as she entered law teaching and the many
problems she encountered as a lone black attempting to
infuse students with a sense of critical analysis.
Harris, Cheryl I., Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev.
1707 (1993). (Themes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Investigates the relationship between race and property.
Examines how "whiteness," originally a form of racial
identity, evolved into a property interest for those who
could define themselves as white. Shows how the
origins of whiteness as a property interest lie in systems
of domination by whites of black and Native American
peoples. Argues that the common premise "whiteness"
and "property" share-a right to exclude-enabled white
identity to become the basis of racial privilege which
allocated societal benefits, these arrangements then
becoming legitimated in law as a kind of status property.
Illustrates how property interest in whiteness was not
discarded in Plessy v. Ferguson2' and Brown v. Board
of Education,28 but rather transformed, and that recent
affirmative action cases mask the privileging of white-
ness in the guise of enshrining the status quo as a
neutral baseline. Concludes that focusing on distortions
created by property interest in whiteness opens alterna-
tive perspectives on the affirmative action debate.
Iglesias, Elizabeth M., Structures of Subordination: Women of
Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 395 (1993). (Themes 1, 6, 7, 10, 11).
27. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Takes issue with recent writing that focuses excessively
on legal meanings and stories of the oppressed in hopes
of improving their condition. Argues instead for atten-
tion to questions of institutional power and the structur-
al violence of daily life, as abetted by law. Borrows from
liberation theology its commitment to material empower-
ment of subordinated people. Argues that the potential
of approaches such as "sensitivity training" and appeals
to empathy has largely been exhausted. Suggests that
a better approach for advancing the objectives of Title
VII and national labor laws would focus on collective
organization of workers and the way in which the legal
system operates to keep workers, especially women of
color, fragmented and powerless.
Ikemoto, Lisa C., Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story
of African-American/Korean-American Conflict: How We
Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1581 (1993).
(Themes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
Analyzes how society constructed, explained, and gave
meaning to "Los Angeles"-the wave of disturbances
that followed the first Rodney King verdict-and espe-
cially to the intergroup conflict that supposedly underlay
those events. Explores the dynamic behind the many
accounts of the L.A. events, noting the way a master
narrative defines race oppositionally and in terms of
power-laden, interest-serving categories and narratives,
including claims of entitlement, racial positioning,
constructed identities and racial pairing. Shows that
"Los Angeles" has become a metaphor for multicultural-
ism's failure and impossibility, as well as a justification
for racial distancing.
Johnson, Alex M., Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirma-
tive Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 1043. (Themes 1, 3, 4, 5, 9).
Shows how benign affirmative action programs have
failed to improve the lot of African-Americans, and
defends racial quotas as a superior means of effecting
change. Refutes the myth that quotas benefit unquali-
fied blacks, and argues that the "objective standards"
created and applied by the white meritocracy are not
objective at all. Insists that, given the history of
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discrimination against blacks in the U.S. and the
ascription of merit to society's dominant group, mandato-
ry admissions quotas for colleges and graduate schools
remain necessary. Points out that the "pool problem"
and other arguments against affirmative action pro-
grams may themselves often be unconscious expressions
of simple racism.
Johnson, Sheri L., The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race)
of Peremptory Challenges, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 21 (1993).
(Themes 1, 4).
Focuses on the defendant's claim that race-based jury
selection violates the guarantee of equal protection of
the law. Reviews cases concerning the use of perempto-
ry challenges to eliminate jurors of different races in
criminal cases, leading up to Hernandez v. New York,29
the "court interpreter" case. Argues that courts are
insufficiently vigilant in cases where a trait, such as
language ability, culture, appearance, or demeanor
serves as a pretext for juror exclusion that is in reality
race-based. Points out that the makeup of a jury
powerfully determines verdicts, especially where the
defendant is a member of a racial minority group. Urges
that the current approach be replaced by a "Strauder"
model of jury selection that would recognize the realities
and dynamics of race in the use of jury strikes.
Johnson, Sheri L., Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 Tul. L.
Rev. 1739 (1993). (Themes 4, 5).
Examines the use of racial stereotypes, both blatant and
subtle, in criminal cases. Shows how negative racial
imagery and slurs often permeate criminal trials from
pretrial publicity, voir dire and opening statements to
testimony, closing arguments, jury instructions, and
deliberations. Discusses specific stereotypes and fears.
Reviews existing remedies that can be used to restrict
racial imagery in trials and shows, through examples,
how they have been for the most part ineffective.
Proposes other measures that could be taken to control
racial stereotyping in criminal cases such as code-of-
29. 50 U.S. 352 (1991).
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ethics provisions forbidding the use of negative racial
imagery, and racial imagery shield laws similar to the
rape shield laws. Warns that society may be slow to
adopt such measures because self-interest and self-
righteousness stand in the way.
Kennedy, Randall, In Praise of the Struggle for Diversity on
Law School Faculties, 22 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1389 (1992).
(Themes 1, 6, 9).
Praises the movement toward diversity. Uses example
of his own institution (Harvard), which did not hire its
first black tenured professor until 1969, to show the slow
pace of racial progress. Points out that diversification is
particularly crucial in the professoriate, since the
newcomers can challenge power and conventional
notions of authority. Characterizes the core aspiration
of the diversity effort as "morally, politically, and
intellectually compelling," and urges that schools avoid
criteria for selecting candidates that are themselves
tainted with racism (such as Supreme Court clerkships).
Encourages diversity proponents not to exaggerate the
role of racial discrimination in explaining the paucity of
minorities on law faculties, nor to succumb to the
credentializing of race and racial voice as criteria for
selection.
Lawrence, Charles R., III, Crossburning and the Sound of
Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment,
37 Vill. L. Rev. 787 (1992). (Themes 1, 2).
Criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V v. City
of St. Paul3" as focusing almost entirely on the free-
speech rights of cross burners while the victims (the
Russ Jones family) are almost entirely absent from the
opinion. Notes that courts often ignore the historical
significance of cross burning and other forms of hate
speech as instruments of terror and repression, trans-
forming an act designed to silence its victims and put
them in their place into an invitation to join a public
discussion. Discusses the upsurge in racist hate crimes
and speech, and argues that the equality principle of
30. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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Brown v. Board of Education3 ' supplies a means of
fashioning remedies to control it.
Lawrence, Charles R., III, Words That Wound: Critical Race
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993).
See Matsuda, Mari J., et al., Words That Wound:
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First
Amendment (1993).32
Matsuda, Mari J., Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado &
Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Words That Wound: Critical Race
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993).
(Themes 1, 2, 3, 4).
Collection of essays on the question of hate speech,
embracing tort, regulatory, and constitutional aspects of
this problem. Points out that the current near-absolut-
ist paradigm of free-speech protection inadequately
protects minorities against the harms of hate speech.
Includes a lengthy analytical introduction explaining
Critical Race Theory and showing the relation of the
emerging anti-hate speech scholarship to that broader
movement.
Nunn, Kenneth B., Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and
the Peremptory Challenge, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 63 (1993).
(Themes 1, 4, 5).
Argues that the Supreme Court's recent jury selection
cases have failed abjectly to control racism in criminal
trials. Attributes this failure to reliance on colorblind
principles which substitute procedural for substantive
equality, an approach that ends up privileging white
over black interests. Concludes with a counternarrative
demonstrating that black defendants are situated
differently from whites with respect to jury discrimina-
tion and that ostensibly neutral treatment silently and
effectively contributes to black subjugation. Urges that
the use of the peremptory challenge to strike black
jurors be prohibited in cases where there is a danger
that the trial will be tainted by racism.
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See infra p. 182.
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Ontiveros, Maria L., Three Perspectives on Workplace Harass-
ment of Women of Color, 23 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 817 (1993).
(Themes 4, 6).
Provides a framework for understanding the roles of
race and culture in workplace harassment of women of
color. Describes how racism and sexism combine to form
an indistinguishable whole from the perspectives of the
harasser, the victim, and the legal system. Argues for
reform through either a modification of the rules
governing sexual harassment, or the creation of a new
cause of action for women of color who are harassed at
the workplace.
Peller, Gary, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias:
Transcending the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 Tl. L. Rev.
2231 (1993). (Themes 1, 3, 6, 9).
Examines racial bias of the criminal justice system and
the way criminal law interacts with American racism.
Discusses the contemporary emphasis on procedure
rather than substance in criminal law. Shows how that
emphasis, combined with the integrationist model of
racial harmony (which discounts race as an arbitrary
attribute), limits the range of discourse about race and
criminal law. Reviews Black Nationalist position that
police conduct in African-American communities resem-
bles colonialism, and calls for community control.
Suggests rejection of premises of neutrality in procedur-
al criminal law and an analysis of substantive criminal
law as "embodying a culturally particular way of ascrib-
ing responsibility and punishment."
Peller, Gary, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81
Geo. L.J. 313 (1992). (Theme 10).
Replies to Mark Tushnet's critique of contemporary legal
scholarship in his article, The Degradation of Constitu-
tional Discourse.33 Takes particular issue with its
critique of the integrity of certain authors, such as
Derrick Bell, Catharine MacKinnon, and Patricia
Williams, and the article's assertion that their writing is
lacking in irony and a sense of proportion, thus contrib-
33. See infra pp. 187-88.
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uting to a "degradation" of legal discourse. Argues that
Tushnet's attack itself is not unbiased and is a manifes-
tation of generational and cultural tensions at work in
the legal academy.
Peller, Gary, Notes Toward a Postmodern Nationalism, 1992 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 1095. (Themes 1, 5, 8).
Discusses tensions between black nationalism and
integration, pointing out potential pitfalls in each.
Proposes a role for white scholars exploring the roots
and voice of the dominant culture, with a view toward
coexisting with blacks as different and sometimes alien
groups, moving toward a cosmopolitan postmodern
nationalism.
Peller, Gary, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 283
(1993).
See Crenshaw, Kimberl6 W. & Gary Peller, Reel
Time/Real Justice, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 283 (1993).
34
Perea, Juan F., Demography and Distrust: An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English,
77 Minn. L. Rev. 269 (1992). (Themes 1, 3).
Recounts history of U.S. "nativism"-anti-immigrant and
anti-minority sentiment aimed at reinforcing the core
culture-and shows that the recent English-only move-
ment is a similar demand for conformity. Shows that
this movement rests on and disseminates a series of
myths such as that national unity depends on a common
language and that the only true language of American
identity is English. Shows how legal history document-
ing the relation between the dominant and other
cultures with respect to language casts doubt on these
myths, indeed that early in our history a variety of
languages other than English were deemed official.
Argues that the intense nativism of the official English
movement and its predecessors is merely a device to
exclude unpopular groups from full citizenship, and
deserves to be resisted as an unwarranted attack on
liberty and the right to equal treatment under the law.
34. See supra p. 168.
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powell, john a., Race and Poverty: A New Focus for Legal
Services, 27 Clearinghouse Rev. 299 (1993). (Themes 1, 5, 6).
Points out that the work of lawyers for the poor and that
of civil rights activists, while valuable and gallant, has
not done much to address the unique problems of the
black poor. Urges greater attention to the way in which
race and poverty intersect. Challenges the assumption
that addressing problems of racial injustice will cause
poverty to recede; and conversely, that redressing
poverty will solve all the problems of the community of
color. Shows that inadequate schools, housing, and
criminal-justice policies trap many blacks in the lower
reaches of income and class. Warns that these problems
will require special treatment if they are not to become
permanent features of our national landscape.
Ramirez, Deborah A., Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchise-
ment of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. Rev.
761. (Themes 3, 7).
Criticizes the United States Supreme Court decision,
Hernandez v. New York,"6 in which the Court held that
it was constitutional to exclude bilinguals from a jury
where witnesses were to testify in Spanish. Responds to
the plurality's assumption that the potential jurors were
challenged only because of deficient responses and not
because of their status as bilinguals. Uses psycholingu-
istic evidence to explain why it is impossible for any
bilingual to comply with an instruction to acknowledge
only the English interpretation of foreign language
testimony when the juror comprehends that foreign
language. Argues that Hernandez effectively discrimi-
nates against Latinos because of the super-correlation
between race and language in the Latino community.
Roberts, Dorothy E., Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 Tul. L.
Rev. 1945 (1993). (Themes 1, 11).
Shows, through numerous examples, the way race is
embedded in the foundation of criminal law (viz., who
criminals are, what conduct constitutes a crime, which
crimes are most serious). Discusses the eugenics
35. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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movement and the long history in the U.S. of biological
solutions (e.g., sterilization and castration) to control
and punish blacks and others deemed "socially inade-
quate." Focuses on the convergence of race, crime, and
reproduction to highlight how new "technologies of
power" (e.g., Norplant, biochemical therapies) are being
used further to oppress and dominate blacks.
Roberts, Dorothy E., Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of
Knowledge, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587 (1993). (Themes 1, 11).
Discusses the impact of the Supreme Court decision in
Rust v. Sullivan 6 which upheld a regulation prohibit-
ing federally funded family planning clinics from
providing information about abortion. Describes the
plight of poor and low-income women dependent on
these clinics for health care and maintains that the
Court inflicted a kind of violence on them. Examines
how oppressors use knowledge to maintain their superi-
or position by determining social meanings, controlling
educational content, stifling sources of information
needed by oppressed groups, and, in the case of the
Supreme Court, manipulating purportedly neutral legal
doctrine. Explores how the oppressed can use knowl-
edge as a means of liberation. Suggests that a proper
constitutional vision would recognize the importance of
knowledge for self-determination and affirm a govern-
mental duty to provide it to those dependent on govern-
ment funds.
Russell, Jennifer M., On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or The
Life of One Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, 28 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 259 (1993). (Themes 2, 3, 9).
Describes her thoughts and feelings on being confronted
by a photograph of a menacing gorilla left anonymously
in her faculty mailbox. Attributes the incident to white
resentment over the presence of a black woman in the
academy and the sense that her appointment must have
come at the expense of a white individual who was not
selected. Describes her reaction to treatment, as the
beneficiary of a "clemency" appointment, at the hands of
36. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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colleagues and students. Points out that diversity
appointments, unaccompanied by structural and attitu-
dinal change on the part of the institution, exact a
severe toll on their beneficiaries.
Spann, Girardeau A., Race Against the Court (1993). (Themes
1,3,5,8).
Book-length expansion of his earlier article, Pure Poli-
tics, 37 on the political strength and prospects of minori-
ties. Argues that blacks and other minority people have
relatively little to gain from Supreme Court litigation,
but much to lose. Urges that a habit of bringing griev-
ances to the courts breeds dependency and is apt to lead
to disillusionment as courts inevitably turn aside claims
that will too radically change the status quo. Suggests
that extrajudicial means, including legislative lobbying
and grassroots activism, will often offer greater possibili-
ties for advancing the black agenda.
Stefancic, Jean & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance:
Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 Iowa L.
Rev. 737 (1993). (Themes 1, 3).
Reviews Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of
Expression, and Non-discrimination,38 a recent collec-
tion of essays about the treatment of hate speech and
hate crimes in many societies. Argues that the experi-
ences of other nations in coping with these problems can
shed light on arguments and counter-arguments com-
monly made in the U.S. debate, includirg that hate-
speech rules are ineffective and that suppressing hateful
expression only makes matters worse. Concludes that
speech and inclusion, dialogue and community are
inseparable-each presupposing, but also threatening,
the other.
Tushnet, Mark, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse,
81 Geo. L.J. 251 (1992). (Theme 10).
Criticizes recent uses of storytelling in the law as
presenting problems of integrity and judgment, reflected
37. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990).
38. STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992).
1994]
188 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
in missteps in literary style and presentation. Concedes
that properly employed, stories and narratives serve to
connect particular cases and general legal rules.
Concludes, however, that this mediation may easily fall
short of its promise by overworking authorial authority,
by an excess of "style," by self-righteousness and moral
superiority, and by cavalier dismissal of alternative
interpretations of the event the writer is describing.
Further illustrates the pitfalls of story construction by
means of the Hill-Thomas hearings and recent Supreme
Court opinions. (Reply by Gary Peller follows.)
West, Cornel, Race Matters (1993). (Themes 1, 3, 6, 8).
Eight essays dealing with the poverty of current dis-
course about race. Urges that the "race problem" is not
that black people bother and endanger whites through
crime and other social pathology (as conservatives
believe), nor that blacks somehow fail or refuse to be
included or integrated into white society (as many
liberals believe). Rather, concludes that the problem of
color is constitutive and symptomatic of our national life;
its solution will require that all must change, not just
blacks. Depicts the rise of both black nationalism and
neo-conservatism as responses to failed national policies
based on hedonism and racial xenophobia. Calls for
visionary leadership, black and white, to rescue U.S.
society from its downward spiral and loss of hope.
COMMENTARY
We offer the following observations on the 1993 Critical
Race Theory literature:
1. Quantity. Readers of the original bibliography might
well be curious to know whether the productivity reflected in
that collection has continued or declined. If anything, it seems
to have increased. Assuming that CRT began as a more or less
formal movement around 1980, it has produced about fifteen to
twenty significant articles and books each year during the
period covered by the first bibliography.39 Last year, however,
39. See supra note 1. The first bibliography included 217 items, most of
which appeared over a 13-year period, 1980-1992, for an average of about 17 per
year.
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we counted fifty-two items using the same criteria as employed
for the first bibliography. The concern that symposia and
bibliographies may signal the beginning of a movement's
decline4 ° seems not to be borne out (so far, at any rate) in the
case of CRT.
2. Quality of the output. It is difficult to devise any sort of
objective measure of the quality of a large body of work. CRT
articles and books appear to be cited regularly by mainstream
and non-mainstream writers. Of the forty-nine law review
articles annotated, eighteen appeared in journals ranked in the
top twenty by the latest Chicago-Kent survey of faculty
scholarship. 4' Three books appeared, each published by a
major press.42
3. Criticism and critical commentary. The movement drew
more criticism than it did in the period covered by the earlier
bibliography.43 Much of the criticism centered around narra-
tive jurisprudence (storytelling), with a number of writers
raising doubts about the validity, authenticity, and usefulness
of that type of scholarship, as well as questioning how story-
based writing could be evaluated for purposes of promotion and
tenure. 44 The literature also contained spirited replies to all
these queries and challenges. 45
4. Assimilation into the mainstream. At the same time
that the movement was attracting and responding to criticism,
it was earning a number of measures of acceptance into the
mainstream. Several law review symposia and collections of
40. Stefancic, supra note 5, at 673 (raising similar possibility in connection
with scholarly symposia).
41. Janet M. Gumm ed., Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship
Survey, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 509 (1990).
42. MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND (1993) (published by
Westview Press); GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT (1993)
(published by New York University Press); and CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS
(1993) (published by Beacon Press).
43. In this bibliography, there are seven works which fall under Theme 10
(criticism and self-criticism; responses). In the earlier bibliography, covering 13
years, there were 45, or approximately three per year.
44. See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, supra p. 175; see also Edward L. Rubin, On
Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889
(1992).
45. See, e.g., Chang, supra pp. 166-67; Culp, You Can Take Them to Water
But You Can't Make Them Drink: Black Legal Scholarship and White Legal
Scholars, supra pp. 169-70; Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to
Farber and Sherry, supra p. 171; Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional
Degradation, supra pp. 183-84.
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articles on non-Critical topics included CRT writers, who were
invited, presumably, to give the Critical viewpoint.46 One CRT
writer (Lani Guinier) was nominated for federal office but
withdrew when her writings on voting rights became controver-
sial. Critical Race scholars appeared on panels and programs
at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools in a proportion much higher than their representation
in the law professoriate at large.47 Two book-length readers
or anthologies reportedly are in the works.4 8 Finally, as we
write, at least one major law review is preparing a symposium
issue devoted entirely to Critical Race Theory.49
5. New writers and collaborations. In 1993, a number of
new writers or combinations Of writers appeared. CRT old-
timers continued to write, but were joined by several notable
newcomers, including Asians and women. A number of
established scholars collaborated, some for the first time, others
with sympathetic whites.5 ° Young scholars published strong
pieces in top journals, including Harvard Law Review.5
6. Mainstream views of CRT: Framing and refraining the
movement. A fascinating phenomenon, about which we find it
difficult to be precise in any quantitative sense, is the way in
which some writers in the scholarly and journalistic main-
46. E.g., Symposium, Civic and Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525
(1993) (containing an article by Richard Delgado); Symposium, Criminal Law,
Criminal Justice, and Race, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807 (1993) (containing a number of
CRT essays); Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993)
(containing an article co-authored by Derrick Bell); Colloquy, Racism in the Wake
of the Los Angeles Riots, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 187 (1993) (containing articles by
several CRT writers); Redistricting in the 1990s: The New York Example, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119 (1993) (containing a contribution by Lani Guinier in an
issue containing collected articles on non-Critical topics); Symposium, Regulating
the Electoral Process, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1409 (1993) (containing an article by Lani
Guinier); Symposium, The Urban Crisis: The Kerner Commission Report Revisited,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1283 (1993) (containing an article by John Calmore).
47. See ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, 1994 PROGRAM OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING (1994) (listing speeches and panel presentations). Of the CRT scholars
listed in our earlier Bibliography, supra note 1, 30 percent, or 19 out of 62, spoke
on panels or programs. For law professors in general, the rate was about 7
percent, or 420 speakers out of a professoriate of approximately 6,000.
48. One is being edited by Richard Delgado; the other by Kimberlb
Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas.
49. Symposium, Critical Race Theory, 82 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter
1994).
50. See, e.g., Bell & Edmonds, supra p. 164; Crenshaw & Peller, supra p.
168; Stefancic & Delgado, supra p. 187.
51. See, e.g., Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra p. 178.
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stream are struggling to characterize and label CRT. Many, of
course, read the literature carefully and come to a relatively
comprehensive understanding of its themes and goals. But
others seem bent on interpreting the movement in a limited or
skewed way. Farber and Sherry, for example, focus on narra-
tives and stories, using those terms virtually interchangeably
with "CRT," as though storytelling were all that Critical Race
thought entailed.52  An early critique by Randall Kennedy
focused almost exclusively on the "racial voice" issue," and a
more recent article by Mark Tushnet took a number of femi-
nists and CRT scholars to task for exaggerated, undocumented,
anecdotal claims contributing, in his view, to a degradation of
constitutional discourse.54 Others criticized Derrick Bell for
undue pessimism or abjuring legal analysis for science-fiction-
style writing.55
Running through much of this commentary is a common
thread: The writer seeks to portray Critical Race Theory in a
way that renders it more manageable, more similar to that
which is known. Some mainstream writers portray CRT as a
variant of Neo-Marxism"6 (known, hence not a threat), or as
largely concerned with defending the rights thesis in the face of
Critical Legal Studies (safe, because a variant of liberalism),57
52. See Farber & Sherry, supra p. 175. But see Delgado,'On Telling Stories
in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, supra p. 171 (pointing out this mistake).
53. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1745 (1989).
54. Tushnet, supra pp. 187-88. But see Peller, The Discourse of Constitution-
al Degradation, supra pp. 183-84 (replying to Tushnet's article).
55. See, e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal
Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM
AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980)) (Bell's work perceptive but despairing,
calculated to chill public interest fervor on the part of readers); john a. powell,
Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 533 (1992) (similar criticism);
Farber & Sherry, supra p. 175 (legal storytelling in general is prone to focus on
graphic tales and anecdotes, ignoring the need to connect them to legal analysis
and doctrine).
56. See Farber & Sherry, supra p. 175 (Critical Race Theory has no special
"voice" of its own but is merely a collection of writers who oppose class oppression);
Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745
(1989) (making this and similar criticisms); Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fight the
Power, THE NATION, Sept. 14, 1989, at 246, 248 (Critical scholars are merely
" playing the race card" in new ways); Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Law, A New
Theory Holds, Has a White Voice, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1992, at A3 (mainstream
scholar questions whether the new legal scholarship's differences amount to
anything more than "politics or class").
57. E.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri
Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647
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or discuss it only in terms of how it makes them feel (viz.,
cheerful, or pessimistic).58
Perhaps many of the above-mentioned features-an
increase in the quantity and quality of the writing, an upsurge
in criticism, and increasing assimilation into the mainstream
occurring simultaneously with efforts to recharacterize the
movement-can all be seen as aspects of homeostasis, the
dominant scholarly paradigm struggling to maintain itself.
This could explain the appearance of sharp, direct criticism,
contemporaneous with the appearance of CRT work in main-
stream journals. It could explain the increased output of
Critical Race writers in response both to the criticism and the
newly opened opportunities and would account for the efforts to
characterize CRT as something else. If we are right, the next
few years of CRT's life will be lively ones as the cross-cutting
forces of criticism, co-optation, resistance, and redoubled effort
play themselves out. It seems to us that at least four scenarios
are possible:
1. CRT becomes the new civil rights orthodoxy. Critical
Race Theory could supplant the old and become the new civil
rights orthodoxy. The voter election proposals put forward by
Lani Guinier could be put in place and proven effective.
Campus hate-speech rules proposed by Charles Lawrence, Mari
Matsuda and others could be adopted, leading the way toward
a more general reconsideration of the role of harmful depiction.
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw and Derrick Bell's critiques of
color-blindness and the myth of equal opportunity could lead
traditional liberals to re-evaluate their own faith in neutrality
and incremental reform. They might then help push through
legislation that takes race into account and work to level the
playing field between whites and people of color. We might
begin to take seriously the "Americanized" federal Indian policy
advocated by Robert Williams and others59 and reform our
(1994).
58. On writers who evaluate CRT scholarship in terms of how it makes
them feel (e.g., poignant, moved, depressed, etc.), see Richard Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1366 (1992).
59. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law:
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian
Jurisprudence, 1986 WiS. L. REV. 219 (annotated in the original bibliography).
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approaches to punishment in the directions suggested by the
late Dwight Greene.6 °
2. CRT marginalized and ignored. The new race scholars
could also be merely ignored, as they were in the movement's
early days. Traditional civil rights scholars could continue to
write about problems of equality from their own perspective,
citing mainly each other and ignoring the perspectives of the
new scholars.
3. CRT analyzed, but rejected. Critical Race Theory has
already attracted scrutiny and criticism. This treatment could
continue and accelerate; the scholarly mainstream could reject
all or most of its tenets and modes of scholarship.
4. Partial incorporation. If CRT is taken seriously, we
believe a fourth outcome is likely. Some of it will be accepted,
while other parts will continue to meet resistance. Mainstream
scholars may impose standards, in the manner of Farber and
Sherry. Under this scenario, some forms of CRT scholarship,
probably' including the narrative turn and the critique of
neutral jurisprudence, will eventually win approval. More
radical features, such as the call for recognizing the status quo
as inherently racist rather than only sporadically so, are likely
to be rejected. But even if only the former, milder insights of
Critical jurisprudence win out, the effort will not be wasted.
The liberal approach to civil rights has been generating little
excitement, much less real-world progress for African-Ameri-
cans and other people of color. If the new outsider scholars
persist, their work in time may come to seem not so strange
and change may come, however slowly.
We are mere bibliographers, not intellectual historians or
prognosticators. Still, we look forward, as many other Critical
readers, scholars, and sympathizers must as well, to what this
movement's contours will look like in five years, when we
intend to renew the bibliography once more.
60. See, e.g., Greene, supra pp. 176-77; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra
note 1, at 489-90.
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